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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY D'ISTRTBUTORS, INC.,
PkLintiff and Respondent,

vs.
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TE·AMS'TE'RS,
INTERN ~TION AL B·ROT'HE:RHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEiURS, WARE HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS ·OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, MTLO V.
RASH, CLARENCE LOTT and
JOSEPH W. BA:LLEW,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10'160

1

RESPONDENT'S B'RIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE

This is a review of ~a nunc pro tunc Order made
and entered by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson,
District Judge.
DlSPOSITION IN 'THE LOWER GOUR'T

The District Court entered a nunc pro tunc
order requiring the Clerk to correct the record to
reflect the terms of the judgment initially made in
the case.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the ruling and action
of the trial court affirmed.
ST~TEMENT

OF FA:CTS

'THE HISTORICAL DE'TAI'L OF THE STATEMENT
OF FACTS OF THE APPgLLANT I'S ESSENTIALLY
CORRECT. THIS RECITATION HAS BEEN MA'DE
EVERY TIME THIS COV'RT HAS IBE'EN REQUESTED
TO PASS UPON ANY PHASE OF THI'S LI'TIGAT'ION.
1

The oft-repeated record cited by the Appellants
in their 'Statement of Facts is but another ,affirmation by them that they have lost at every turn.
1

Specific attention is called to page 12 of the
Appellant's Brief at which place they make a reference to what the trial court Judge in C1aJliiornia
decided.
'There is no record upon this subject but the
trial judge in California did not say that he wou'ld
not grant a judgment for interest. He said if he
applied California law he would certainly grant the
interest. U·tah law in this connection applies, and
this the trial judge recognized.
He, therefore, continued the case until the matter of interest was clarified by the Utah trial judge,
or this court, or by the citation of other Utah case::;
clearly defining the Utah law on this subject.
2
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STATEME'NT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE ·JUDGME'NT WAS NOT AMENtDE'D BUT CONFORMED TO RECORD WH'AT IN LEGAL ·FA!CT OCCURRED WHEN JUDGME'NT WAS ENTERE'D UPON
THE ORIGINAL VERDI·CT.
POINT II.
THE MATTER OF WHETHEH INTEREST ATT~CHES AT THE 'STATUTORY RATE TO A 'JUDGMENT UPON A VERDICT TS CONTROLLED BY UTAH
ljAW.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT, UN'DER UTAH RULE'S, AND
LAW, HAS INHERENT POWEH TO 'MAKE ITS RECORDS AOCUR.A:TE AND TO REFLECT WHAT LEGAL
JUDGMENT WAS EINTERED UPON THE VE'RDICT.
1

POINT IV.
THE LOCAL LAW IGON'TRODS 'THE MAT'TER OF
INTERES'T ON JUDGMENTS RECOVERED TN STATE
OR FEDERAL COURTS.
POINT V.
THERE IS NO WAY IN WHTCH THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEA!IJS FOR 'THE TE NTH CIRCUIT COUUD POSSJtBLY AFFIRM OR OTHERWISE
MODIFY THE DE'CIS1ION OF THE UTAH ·SUPREME
COURT IN THIS O.A:SE.
1

ARGUMEN'T
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT WAS NOT AMENDED BUT ·CONFORMED TO REOORD WHAT IN LE GA!L FA!CT OCCURRED WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERE'D UPON
THE ORIGINAL VERDICT.
1

It is the position of the respondent that no
3
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amendment to the judgment was made by the tri1al
court. The action of the trial court was simply to
conform the original document called a judgment
to reflect the legal relationship which the judgment
created.
The act of the trial judge complained of by the
appellants was to reflect fue interest which attached
to the judgment as a matter of law.
POINT II.
'THE MATTER OF WHE'THER INTEREST ATTACHES AT THE STATUTORY RATE TO A JUDGMENT UPON A VERDICT IS CONTROLLED BY UTAH
L.A:W.

The respondent relies upon Utah law for the
attachment of interest to a judgment. The following
are the rules of procedure and the statute upon
which the respondent relies.
Rule 54 (e) provides as follows:
''Interest and costs to be included in the
Judgment. The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or as'certained. The clerk must, within
two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a simi'lar notation thereof in
the Registrar or Actions and in the Judgment
Docket.
It is the contention of the respondent further,
4
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as will be developed in this brief, that Utah l·aw
applies. Hence, it is pertinent to observe in this
connection that there is no Federal rule of similar
import to Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
There is a contention in the appellants' Brief
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are contrdlling in this instance and that the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure must have been an unnecessary
exercise in futility and repetition. The respondent
does not so lightly regard the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The respondent further relies upon Rules 60(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as fol'lows:
"' (a) Clerical M'istakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record an'd errors therein arising fron1
oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time (emphasis ours) of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal
is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the a ppea;I is pending may be so
corre~ted with leave of the appellate court."
The statute upon which the respondent relies
with respect to the attachment of interest to a judgment is 15-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, which r~ads
as follovvs:
"Interest on Judgments. Any judgment
5
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rendered on a lawful contract shall conform
thereto and shaH bear the interest agreed
upon by the parties which shari be specified
in the judgment; other judgments shall bear
interest at the ~ate of 8% per annum."
'The consideration and the construction of these
provisions of our Rules of Civil iProce'dure and our
statute make it apparent that notwithstanding the
failure of the Clerk to write in the figure 8% in
the original judgment document, is not controlling
and that these provisions of our rules and statutes
are.
'POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT, UNDE'R UTA'H RVL1E'S, AND
LAW, HAS INHERENT POWER TO MAKE ITS RECORDS AOCURATE AND 'TO REFLECT WHAT LEGAL
JUDGMENT WAS E NTERED UPON THE VEHDICT.
1

This Court and others have frequently held
that a trial judge has the inherent power to correct
any record to make it reflect accurately what tr,anspired in any legal proceeding before the trial judge.
Representative of these decisions are the following cases decided by this Court.
Kettner vs. Snow, 3'75 P.2d 28, 13 U.2d 382,
384.
The decision cited is the 19'6'2 opinion of this
Court. It came to this court as an original proceeding by the defendants in the trial court to prohibit
the tria'! court from further pro'ceeding with the
matter.
It arose out of an action for recovery of dam6
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ages for personal injuries and property. A jury
returned a verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiffs in the trial court permitted the time to go by
within which they might have served ~and filed a
Motion for New Trial. Later they presented to the
trial court an order permitting them to file a motion for new trial which was signed by the District
Judge nunc pro tunc. A further order was also presented to the District Judge which he signed, permitting the expanding of time within which an
affidavit in support of the Motion might be filed.
This Court held that under the circumstances
existing in that case the trial judge di'd not have
the authority to change the rules and to permit, by
the filing of an order nunc pro tunc, the increase
of tin1e which the rules had 'limited.
The case is, however, ·cited for the expression of
the general law in the opinion by Mr. Justice Crockett, which says as follows :
"We are not unmindful of the fact that
that in proper circumstances, where the interest of justice so require the court has
power to a'ct nunc pro tun~, that is, to do an
act upon one date and make it effective as
of a prior date. It is recognized that clerical
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied
so the record will accurately reflect that which
in fact took p'lace."
As already indicated, it is the position of the
respon'dent that what Judge Anderson did in this
case by reason of his order nunc pro tunc was simply
7
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to correct the record so it accurately reflected that
which in fact took place.
The second case which the respondent asserts
in support of its position, is Cook vs. Gardner, 381
P.2d 78, 14 U.'2d f9'3, 195. This action arose by reason of the suit of the plain tiff against the widow and
the executrix of his business associate to compel
transfer to him of certain shares of stock. The plaintiff prevailed and the defendant appealed. One of
the points of attack upon the judgment made by
the :appellant was that the action below was at one
time dismissed on the defendant's motion and the
minute entry said that it was dismissed with prejudice.
'Thereafter the trial judge entered an order
saying that the action was dismissed without prejudice.
The appellant's contention was that the trial
judge had improperly inserted the word "without" in
its order in 'contravention of the previous minute
order entry.
The opinion df this Court, also by Mr. Justice
Crockett, said as follows :
"'The contention of the appellant is with
out merit. First because it is the prerogative
of the court to correct any error or supply any
deficiency in its records that m:ay have occurred because of mistake or inadvertance."
These two cases are simply cited for the original principle that. the trial court has the inherent
8
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right to n1ake its records conform with that which
was legally done.
The respondent commends to the attention of
the court the case of Howard vs. Howard, 298 P .2d
48, 49, 50, a 19 56 case of the District Court of Appeals of the Second District, Division 1, of the State
of 'California.
The case was an appeal by the defendant husband from an order denying the appellant's motion
asking that the County Clerk be directed to enter a
full satisfaction of an interlocutory judgment of
divorce, with particular respect to an attorney's
fee and costs. And further, that the Sheriff cease
making attempts to collect interest on the judgment
for attorney's fees.
There was no controversy with respect to the
fees ordered to be paid to the wife's attorney, and
the only question in the lawsuit involved the matter
of whether interest was allowable upon the judgment.
In that case the respondent's position was that
any judgment awarding money, automatically bore
interest on the judgment at the rate of 77a (the
rate in California), until paid, even though the
form of judgment itself ma'de no provision for interest thereon.
The trial court's language, which was quoted
by the appellate court in this case, is as follows:
"It seems to me a simple elementary tiring
1

9
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where one party deprives another party of
money which is rightfully theirs, pursuant to
court order, it bears interest 7 7o from the
date due. That it my holding."
The appellate court further quoted the trial
court in this regard :as follows :
"I am not concerned with the forms in
any respect. Both of you have to some extent
relied on what the forms contain or omit. I
don't think that is the ~least bit material. 'The
only question is, what is the law. Does the
law provide for interest on attorney's fee or
does it not? If the forms :are inadequate they
will have to be changed then, not the 1aw."
The opinion of the appela:te court contains the
following language which the respondent feels is
applicab'le in this case.
''Likewise, appellant's arguments that
the form and wording of the writ of execution precludes allowance of interest or that
its use by respondent constitutes a waiver
of interest are without merit. As observed by
the trial court, the allowance of interest on a.
money judgment is not dependent upon forms
or phr.aseology but is automaticaHy allowed
by law."
It is precisely this doctrine upon which the
respondent depends. Finally tlle respondent urges
that a consideration of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the statutes require the appli~ation
of the language just cited.
10
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POINT IV.
THE LOCAL LAW CONTROLS THE MATTER OF
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS RECOVERED IN STATE
01~ FE'DERAL COURTS.

The original action w.as filed, tried and judgment rendered in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. That State 'District Court was authorized to entertain jurisdiction
by the Federal Congress under the provisions of
Section 303 (b) , Labor Management Relations Act,
61 Stat. 158.
With respect to this authorization the Tenth
Circuit Court in its opinion relating to a previous
appeal in this case, reported as Dairy Distributors,
Inc. vs. Western Conference of Teamsters, 294
F.2d 348 (lOth Cir., Utah), stated:
''The grant of jurisdiction to state courts
to try and de~ide certain issues under the
Labor Management Act carries with it the
inherent power to interpret the act and to
decide factual matters necessary for the proper and lawful administration of the act. 'The
grant of such jurisdiction to State Courts and
the similar grant to the United States District Court does not contemplate the 'dual
remedy or a dry run in either ·court."
With the grant of jurisdiction to try such cases,
the Federal Congress also left to the local state courts
the procedures by which such cases would be tried
and the nature of judgments which would reflect
their determination. As heretofore observed, Utah
law requires that judgments rendered sh:a1ll bear
11
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interest at the rate of 8% per annum. Section 15-1-4,
U.C.A., 195'3. The result in this respect could not
have been different had the trial been conducted and
judgment rendered in the Federal ·District Court of
Utah, because Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 19'61 provides:
'Interest shall be allowed on 1any money
judgment in a civ1l case recovered in a District
Court. Exe·cution therefor may be levied by
the marshall in any case where, by the law
of the 'State in which such court is held, execution may he levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the state.
Such interest shaN be calculated from the date
of the entry of the judgment at the rate allowed by the 'State law. June '25, 1'94'8, c 646,
6'2 Stat. 9'5 7."
'The purpose of this statute an'd its predecessor,
·2'8 U.S. C.A. Sec. 811, which was overlooked or ignored by appellant in its brief, as stated in the case
of Washington and G. R. Co. vs. Harmon, (1'89'3),
147 U.S. '57 1, was to bring about uniformity between
the state courts and the federal courts sitting within the state upon the subject of interest. Without
the statute a successful plaintiff, suing on a cause
of action o'f which the state and federal ·courts had
concurrent jurisdiction, would be deprived of interest on his judgment by proceeding in the federal
court.
The Supreme Court in the case of Massachusett.'3
Benefit Association vs. Miles, 137 U.S. 689 (1891),
stated with respect to interest on judgments:
1

'

1

12
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"The courts of the states and the federal
court sitting within the state should always be
in harmony on this point. Both in Holden v.
Trust Co., 100 U.S. 72, and in Ohio v. Frank,
103 U.S. 697, it was held that the question of
interest is always one of local law."
Again, in the case of Klaxon Co. vs. Stentor Co.,
31'3 U.S. 487 (1941), Justi~e Reed speaking for
the court determined that the allowance of interest
on a judgment obtained in a Federal Court, or the
method df determining it, was a procedural matter
and not substantive, and that " ... the proper function of the Delaware Federal Court is to ascertain
what the state law is, not what it ought to be."
The application of '28 U.S.C.A. Section t961 is
mandatory. In Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d '260 (6th
Cir, '1943), judgment was entered for $'6,500.00
and costs but was silent on the question of interest.
The Circuit Court affirmed the Fe'deral District
Court and the mandate was a:lso silent as to the
provision of interest. On petition the Circuit Court
ruled that the interest was applicable from the date
of judgment unti'l paid at the same rate provided in
similar judgments in the Courts of Tennessee, the
state in which the Court was sitting. The foUowing
is taken from the language of the opinion (page

261):
"The court, in the present case, had no
discretion in the rna tter of withholding or
awarding interest. Therefore, the fact that
the judgment of the trial'court and the mandate of this court made no specific award of
13
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interest, is immaterial. 'The allowance of the
legal rate of interest under the laws of the
State of Tennessee and for the period provided under '28 U.'S.C.A. Sec. 8'1'1, was mandatory."
The Federal stature mentioned automatically
implements the interest provisions of Seetion 1'5-1-4
U.C.A., 1'953, on the judgment here involved. The
appellant, however, 'Contends that while a state court
may be authorized to try and render judgments in
controversy involving a Feder,aJl law, that it has no
authority "to add to a judgment interest on the
judgment rendered". (Appellants' Brief, p. 15). It
is true that a state court or a federal court is without power to add ''pre-judgment interest" as a part
of the compensable damages. However, this has no
reference to the interest required by statute to run on
the judgment itself. 'The opinion in the case of MooreMcCormack Lines v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 89'3, 895,
('1st Cir., 19'53) is explicit on this point.
"* * *[A] distinction must be made between (1) the running of interest upon a
judgment debt from the date the judgment
was entered to the date of payment, and ('2)
the allowance of pre-judgment interest to be
included as an i tern of damages in the total
amount of an ensuing money judgment, in
order that the plaintiff may be more fully and
justly compensated for the wrong complained
of. The latter may be regarded as a part of
the substance of tlle claims sued upon, for
which a money judgment is sought.
"'28 N.S.C. Sec. 1961 belongs in category
14
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( 1 ) above. The provisions of Section 811 of
the Act of August 23, 1942, 5 State. 518. The
purpose was simply to provide that money
judgments of federal courts should bear interest from the date of the entry of the judg.:.
ment collectible in the same way and at the
same rate as provided in the local state law
for the allowance of interest on money judgments recovered in state courts. Interest upon
the amount of a money judgment rendered
by a federal 'Court runs autom~a:tically, by the
manadatory provision of 2'8 U.S.C. Sec. 1'9'61,
even though the judgment itseTf - as in 'the
case at 'bar -contains no specific award of
such interest.... But 28 'U.S.C. Section 1961
has no bearing on the problem whether prejudgment interest is allowable as an item of
damages on a particular claim, to be incl uaed
in the total amount of the money judgment."
The authorities cited by the appellant at page
15 of its Brier, refer to matters relating to pre-judgment interest, or similar situations and are not in
point insofar as this case is concerned. They do not
deal with judgments rendered as in the present case,
nor do they involve a state statute requiring the
application of interest upon the judgment.
In the recent case of Woodmont, Inc. vs. D:aniels,
290 F.2d 186 (lOth Cir., Utah 19'61), the Tenth
Circuit Court held that Sec. 15-1-4, U.C.A., 1953,
required that interest be allowed on a judgment even
though the prevailing party participated affirmatively on appeal It further observed that where interest on a judgment is not specifically fixed in
some other manner, the law of the state is ·control1

1

15
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~ing.

The appellant admits that the Labor Management Relations Act ('Taft-Hartley Act) is silent
''as to whether or not a 'judgment such as here involved is to bear interest" (Appellant's Brief p. 17).
Thus, by its own admission, and the application of
the Federal statute and case law, the interest provision contained in Se·ction 15-1-4, U.C.A. ('19'53),
is effective in the present case, and the allowance of
interest on the judgment at the statutory rate of 8 7o
per annum is proper from the date of entry of said
judgment.
POINT V.
'THE'R'E IS NO W'AY IN WHI GH THE UNITED
STATES COUR'T OF A PPEALS FOR TiRE TEN'TH CIRCUIT COUUD 'POSSIBLY AFFIRM OR OT-HERWISE
MODIFY THE DECISION OF THE UTXH SUPREME
COURT IN THIS C.A:SE.
1

1

In support of Point V of the Brief, it is
necessary to quote from the Appellants' Brief, particularly with reference to that material which appears on page '26.
"It therefore follows that when the Supreme Court of Utah and the Tenth Circuit
Court of app6als affirmed the Jt~dgment rendered by the Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah, the trial court was bound by
the judgment so render.ed and may not ignore
the mandate or direction of the appellate
courts. '(Emphasis adde'd)
·The contention of the appellant that the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the Utah Supreme Court, or more particularly the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 'Utah, is
16
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not only difficult to understand, but impossible to
support.
In support of the position of the responden t in
this matter, all that need be done is to make reference to the appendix of the Appellant's Brief where
it relates to the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the 'Tenth Circuit.
It is necessary at this point to make reference
to the proceeding in the United States District Court
in Salt Lake City, in which it was attempted to enjoin the collection or enforcement of the judgment.
From the injunction ordered and entered by
the United States District Judge, an appeal was
taken to the United States Circuit Court for the
Tenth Circuit.
Having reviewed the matter, the United States
Circuit Court of the 'Tenth Circuit, reversed and
remanded that decision of the United States 'District
Judge. The final statement of the United States
Circuit Court is as follows :
"Reversed and remanded with directions
to vacate the injunction."
The most cursory review of the decision of
the Tenth Circuit Court could conclude wi'th nothing
but that the appellate court had in clear and direct
language, told the United States Judge for the District of Utah, that he had made a mistake and they
erased the decision he made to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment.
There is no conceivable way in which the judg1
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ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit could be construed as having passed
upon the recti tude of the decision of the Third Disw
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, or
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons delineated heretofore, it is respectfully suggested that this court should approve
and affirm the urder of Judge Aldon Anderson from
which this appeal was taken.
Respectfully submitted,
REX J. HA·NSON
MERLIN R. L YBBER·T
A:R·T·HUR A. AL\LEN, JR.
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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